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even though wireless monitoring is fairly well understood. 
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Organisational Factors and Australian IT Professionals' Views of Wireless Network 
Vulnerability Assessments 
1 Introduction 
This paper reports on a study of Australian IT professionals' use of and opinions about 
wireless network vulnerability assessments (WNV As) and the organisational factors, 
especially culture, decision-making and professional identity, which may affect this. 
Protecting a business organisation's wireless networks presents a classic case of how a 
technically sophisticated, effective and therefore 'obvious' engineering approach to an 
important security problem can be undermined by not taking into account its social 
implications, both inside the organisations where the solutions are implemented, and beyond 
them. 
1.1 Wireless network security and organisational culture 
For the very reason that the technical solutions to computer security issues appear simple and 
the need for them clear (at least to those who developed the solutions), their social 
implications may be difficult for others in the organisation to see, even IT staff. The concepts 
of organisational culture and especially subculture, that is, the accepted, often unspoken 
agreements and divisions in 'how we do things around here' go a fair way to explaining why 
such perceptual divisions are likely to occur and persist within organisations. We will 
consider culture and subculture from an internal perspective in more detail later in the paper. 
Organisational culture is also impacted by the external environment. This has been shown at a 
broad level by Hofstede's (1980,1991,1993) well known studies of national differences in 
culture. Hofstede's work was undertaken by surveying more than 116,000 IBM employees in 
more than 40 countries about their work related values. Surveying employees of the same 
organisation in many countries allowed a variety of national differences in culture to be 
revealed. Within anyone country, social implications of and attitudes towards computer 
security are likely to be affected by that country's culture. Case researchers such as Spurling 
(1995), who investigated how the Australian firm Alcoa promoted security awareness and 
overhauled its security systems, have found evidence suggesting this. Because of the link 
between external and internal aspects of organisational culture, even IT security 
professionals' views about computer security may be affected by the anxieties and 
ambivalences that surround computer security issues in the wider society. 
1.2 Wireless networking, security risk and organisational culture 
As we will see in more detail later, attitudes to risk are a typical part of an organisation's 
culture. Computer security risk is becoming an increasingly important issue, particularly as 
applications and uses of wireless network (WLANs) are continuing to develop rapidly in line 
with the equally rapid development of the 802.11 family of standards and amendments on 
which the vast majority of wireless networks are based. WLANs enjoy high awareness and 
acceptance in organisations as they are now fast, cheap and easy to use compared with 
traditional wired networks. However Housley and Arbaugh (2003) comment that there is as 
yet a disturbingly low level of security for these networks, especially given that the very 
nature of wireless transmissions makes it easy to attack them. Specifically, it is easier both to 
intercept signals during transmission and to 'spoof fraudulent messages on a wireless 
network compared to a wired network because the data travelling across a wireless network is 
transmitted to anyone capable of receiving within range of the signal. Security of information 
is of course of paramount importance to organisations which use wireless networks. If these 
networks are left vulnerable, organisations can suffer a whole range of consequences from the 
trivial and annoying to a potentially shattering organisational blow. 
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1.3 Two approaches to wireless network vulnerability assessment 
Wireless network vulnerability assessment (WNV A) is the general term for methods of 
ensuring that wireless networks are as safe as possible. One kind, wireless monitoring, is a 
passive approach to testing security measures since it does not involve an attack on a network 
but rather gathers information about a network that could be put to use in the implementation 
of an attack - or would allow a network manager to determine if a network has any obvious 
security flaws. Depending on how it is used wireless monitoring could fall on either side of 
the boundary of legality or good ethics. Nevertheless a number of security professionals (eg 
BergheI2004; Henning 2003; Tiller 2005) see it as an indispensable component in developing 
a secure wireless network. 
A second, complementary approach to wireless network vulnerability assessment is 
penetration testing (penetration testing), which involves an active attempt to reach the 
wireless network to test how effective the security measures are in keeping unauthorised users 
and devices out of the network. It does not involve a full attack on the network, in which an 
'attacker' attempts to copy or delete sensitive data and avoid being detected by those 
responsible for the network. It is a test to see if the wireless network's security measures can 
be penetrated, and the network accessed. 
The issue of wireless security is well covered in a number of texts aimed at security 
professionals', for example Nichols and Lekkas (2002), Peltier et al. (2003) and Tiller (2005). 
Penetration testing in particular is well understood. However it is not known how widespread 
WNV A is within organisations. In addition, there is as yet no comprehensive framework 
outlining how to conduct a comprehensive WNV A. That is, there is no guide involving both 
wireless monitoring and penetration testing approaches which could help IT professionals 
identify the goals of a vulnerability assessment, prepare for the assessment, actually conduct 
it, analyse the results, and fix any security flaws that may have been identified. It would be 
useful to know whether IT professionals would find such a guide helpful. A prototype 
framework for a WNV A which reflects this lack of integration of the two approaches appears 
in Figure 1 overleaf. 
2 Finding out IT professionals' use of and views about WNVAs 
A study of what IT professionals actually do and think about WNV As was conducted via a 
mail-out survey to members of the Information Security Interest Group (ISIG), an Australian 
organisation based in Sydney. The ISIG is a group of approximately 400 networking security 
professionals who were likely to have sole or shared responsibility for the management of one 
or more 802.11-based wireless networks. The study aimed to clarify some of the problems 
and unknown elements around IT professionals' use of WNV As and their views on whether 
having a comprehensive framework for WNV As would help them. 
The survey contained both closed-ended and open-ended questions, giving respondents the 
opportunity to include additional information or opinion on specific issues. The study did not 
aim to link one variable causally with another, nor did it try to identify correlations between 
two or more variables, for example to try to connect views about WNV A issues with aspects 
of the IT professionals themselves or their organisations. Nevertheless the surprising nature of 
some of the results and the patterns in them suggest that some organisational factors, 
especially aspects of organisational culture and issues around IT professionals' identity, may 
have influenced the results. The results and discussion of these potential organisational 
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Figure 1: Prototype vulnerability assessment framework 
1. the extent of use of WNV As, including either or both wireless monitoring and 
penetration testing, 
2. how IT professionals used WNV As, and 
3. their opinions about the two approaches to WNV As, and about aspects of 
vulnerability assessment frameworks. 
3 Results 
3.1 Use of vulnerability assessments 
A total of 62 useable survey responses were received. This appears a modest result, but given 
that the organisation consists of only about 400 members, the responses can be assumed to 
provide a reasonable view of the group whose views were sought. 
Of the 62 respondents, only ten (16 percent) said they used wireless monitoring and three (5 
percent) used penetration testing. This was a surprisingly low result, especially for wireless 
monitoring, which is widely known and publicised amongst IT professionals. The most 
common reason given in for not using wireless monitoring and penetration testing was that 
they were felt unnecessary. The second most common reason was a perceived lack of the 
necessary expertise for the two kinds of testing. Interestingly, lack of resources or other 
reasons were not perceived to be the problem. 
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3.1.1 Discussion: The possible role of organisational culture 
When possible organisational factors are considered, however, especially organisational 
culture, it is less surprising that WNV As have yet to find acceptance within organisations, 
even among IT professionals. Organisational culture encompasses such issues as the degree to 
which employees are expected to pay attention to detail and to results, and be aggressive and 
competitive. It also includes the degree to which organisations are oriented around people's 
needs, rely on teams to organise work, and emphasise stability rather than growth (O'Reilly, 
Chatman & Caldwell 1991). An organisation's culture is known to be strongly influenced by 
senior management's style and preferences, the organisation's work and communication 
practices, reward structures, past history, power relationships, customer or user demands, 
accepted explanations of competitive pressures, and so on (Schein 1985). Culture serves as a 
powerful, practical and yet tacit way of organising management and employees' (including IT 
staffs) knowledge of the organisation's priorities and ways of operating. 
Cultural values and assumptions, which are embedded at a deep level, sometimes remain 
when circumstances have changed, inhibiting the organisation's ability to respond to change. 
Thus earlier cultural norms about organisational security may outweigh IT professionals' 
judgements or even awareness of the need to revise standard security measures. We could 
predict, for example, that WNVAs would not be seen as necessary, since powerful 
organisational stakeholders including senior management, and even IT staff themselves, may 
still hold a traditional, 'wired network' view of their organisation, even though this is now 
more a part of history than reality. Many of the vulnerability assessment frameworks 
currently available are also based on the assumption that they will be applied in a wired rather 
than a wireless environment (Dyce 2005). This would tend to entrench the existing security 
norms of many organisations. 
As the O'Reilly, Chatman & Caldwell (1991) formulation of cultural elements suggests, 
aspects of organisational culture strongly influence perceptions of what is important to 
organisational success. So culture also tends to dictate the choice of matters organisational 
members see as worthy of their time and effort. This may help explain why lack of time and 
expertise (rather than lack of financial resources), as well as senior management's discomfort 
with both the idea of hacking into the network, mean neither wireless monitoring nor 
penetration testing were regularly used. 
3.1.2 Dominant cultures and subcultures 
These explanations relate to views of the dominant organisational culture, generally the one 
espoused by senior management. However researchers on organisational culture such as 
Jermier et al. (1991) and Sackmann (1992) also point to the existence in most sizeable 
organisations of one or more subcultures which mayor may not work in the same direction as 
the dominant organisational culture. Senior management, who as non-IT experts are unlikely 
to know much about the technical detail of WNV As, may assume penetration testing involves 
hacking into the network, actually deleting data and then concealing the attack. IT security 
staff, by contrast, would most likely know that merely showing that a potential intruder could 
access the network is all penetration testing actually requires. If this is true, and it would be 
useful to undertake further research to establish the point, the dominant culture could be 
behind the lack of use of penetration testing. 
By contrast, the IT subculture alone or in combination with the dominant culture may well be 
behind the non-use of wireless monitoring. As noted earlier, wireless monitoring can be used 
for illegal and/or unethical activity, such as monitoring which invades the privacy of 
employees or other parties. IT staff may therefore be concerned that using wireless 
monitoring may cause them as a group to be perceived by other organisational members as 
instigating inappropriate monitoring practices. Senior managers may be less concerned about 
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this perception. After all many large organisations already monitor employees' web use and 
have told them this. However they may still be concerned about implementing new, possibly 
unpopular monitoring practices unless there is an overwhelming and demonstrated need to do 
so. In this case the dominant and the IT sub-culture may work together to discourage use of 
wireless monitoring. 
3.2 How WNVAs are used 
The answers to this section of the questionnaire broadly indicated that of the ten WNV A users 
in the sample, most had found that using either wireless monitoring or penetration testing or a 
combination of the two had proved valuable, in that network vulnerabilities had been 
revealed. A range of vulnerabilities had been both tested for and found, the latter ranging 
from incorrect security configurations, rogue W APs, overextended network boundaries and 
newly publicised vulnerabilities. A majority of those in the sample who used WNV A also 
indicated that one or other or both of wireless monitoring and penetration testing were part of 
the standard security procedures in their organisations. The results of a question about what 
practices are used as part of standard security procedure indicated that six of the ten WNV A 
users used just wireless monitoring, none used just penetration testing, and three used both. It 
was rare however to find that both wireless monitoring and penetration testing were used 
simultaneously in an organisation. 
3.2.1 Discussion 
In an earlier part of the results, thirty respondents or about half the sample said they believed 
a WNV A framework would help those who don't use either wireless monitoring or 
penetration testing due to lack of expertise. Moreover, the experience of WNV A users 
suggests that WNV As are proving useful to organisations, and that users themselves 
recognise the value of making a WNV A a consistent procedure. The gap between the two 
findings - thirty respondents who believe a WNV A framework could be helpful for those 
who lack expertise, and only ten actual users - suggests that the lack of good WNV A 
frameworks may be preventing IT staff from implementing WNV As. The next section 
explores this possibility further. 
3.3 Practitioners' opinions about WNVAs including WNVAframeworks 
In light of the findings about how WNV As are used, it was surprising that practically all ten 
respondents who used WNV As said they did not use a framework or a methodology to help 
them conduct security procedures. Three of the ten used a wireless monitoring framework; 
two of the ten used a penetration testing framework. Seven of the ten considered planning to 
be valuable as part of WNV As, but only one had researched what approach to use. Very few 
used a framework (or knew where they could find one) for setting up, evaluating or refining a 
WNV A exercise. In addition, very few felt a WNV A should be done routinely after network 
changes, despite the fact that such changes may introduce network vulnerabilities. 
3.3.1 Discussion - the possible role of organisational decision-making style 
IT professionals using WNV As have found them useful and incorporated them into standard 
operating procedures. At first glance, this makes it surprising that very few IT professionals in 
this sample used of any framework to carry out a WNV A. However styles of organisational 
decision-making may explain this situation. Styles of decision-making, whether slow and 
considered, or fast and impulsive, also form part of culture. 'Planning' will fit with espoused 
values of rationality in most organisations' cultures, and also with cultures which are 
'outcomes' rather than 'process' focussed. According to Simon (1979), however, in practice it 
is often impossible to explore planning options exhaustively because of time constraints and 
other limitations of the working environment. Instead, people typically use what he has called 
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'bounded' decision-making. That is, they make decisions on the base of limited research and 
choose from a reduced number of options. Because a limited range of options has been 
explored, bounded decision-making may lead to less than optimal results. 
The absence of a well known and established WNV A framework could explain why most of 
the ten WNV A users would report that they endorse 'planning' in WNV As but actually make 
little or no use of planning frameworks. The amount of time and expertise needed to find an 
appropriate framework, and then seek support for its use from senior management or other 
areas of the organisation, could discourage even those who claim to plan their WNV As. The 
easier alternative would be to use no framework, and also carry out the WNV A without 
informing other organisational members. The time needed both to find and gain support for a 
procedure which other parts of the organisation are likely to misunderstand and mistrust, as 
well the fear of hacking mentioned earlier, could explain the finding that the majority of 
WNV As users preferred that other organisational members not know that vulnerability 
assessments are used. As Takanen et al. (2004) have argued in their discussion of the 
distributions of responsibility among various actors in software vulnerability situations, this 
could compromise the ethical standards of the IT staff carrying out the procedure. 
4 Conclusions 
Organisational culture - especially because of its link with concerns in the wider society -
may explain why IT professionals typically don't use either kind of WNV A or even seem to 
know about them. Wireless monitoring, as we have seen, entails surveillance of human 
activity on an important aspect of an organisation's infrastructure: its networks. On the one 
hand, as a population, we are becoming used to surveillance. We are being watched more than 
ever before, via cameras at shopping centres, e-tags in tunnels, and a vast range of electronic 
transactions. A lot of the time we are not bothered by this, and overlook how much 
surveillance is being done. An example of this 'aware and yet not aware' attitude is 
demonstrated in how a recent murder conviction in an Australian capital city was secured. 
The perpetrator claimed he was asleep at home in another city at the time of the crime, but 
evidence obtained from e-tag data - a form of daily surveillance that inner city drivers know 
about but forget - showed his car had been moving towards the victim's location shortly 
beforehand. 
So we are often relaxed, 'knowing but unknowing' , about surveillance. It is becoming part of 
our culture both in our organisations and outside them. However we are typically less 
sanguine when it is pointed out how much surveillance we are being subjected to. Australians 
have so far rejected smart identity cards, perhaps feeling that their convenience would be 
outweighed by increased surveillance they might lead to. Wireless monitoring, because it 
involves surveillance, could well create this ambivalence on the part of non IT staff. Even 
computer security staff may be ambivalent about wireless monitoring because of their 
concerns about how other organisational members will perceive them. Vulnerability 
assessments using penetration testing, with its overtones of an attack, could create even more 
anxiety. Again, while computer security staff may know that no real attack will happen, they 
may dislike being regarded by others as something akin to a hacker and having to explain 
their role. In short, employees, including IT staff, live in the external world as well as the 
world of their organisations. So while they are likely to see the need for computer security 
they may also be ambivalent about what they have to do to achieve it. 
5 Recommendations 
According to Dunphy and Stace (1993), dealing with the effects of organisational culture 
involves either living within the culture as it is and making the most of its positive aspects, or 
trying to change the culture. 
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5.1 Improving organisational security within the existing organisational culture 
The implications for businesses wanting to improve their computer security are that they need 
to take account of how aspects of organisational culture may work against computer security 
as well as for it. With respect to wireless network security, they need to be aware of the 
anxieties - both internal and external- that are likely to be associated with WNVAs. 
Businesses have always needed to be mindful of how their activities are perceived by both 
their external and internal 'publics'. The difficulties ofEnron, Shell, the Australian Wheat 
Board, James Hardie and many other firms which have been accused of poor behaviour, are 
due in part to what people - insiders as well as outsiders - believed they could do as well as 
what they actually did do. Living with this situation, as XXX has shown, requires frequent 
and credible communication with the organisation's internal and external publics about why 
specific security strategies are necessary. 
5.2 Improving organisational security by changing organisational culture 
Tacit knowledge as embodied in organisational culture may be altered, although this is 
typically difficult and time-consuming. Various approaches to changing organisational culture 
in the interests of helping the organisation adapt to other necessary change have been 
examined by change theorists such as Argyris (1990), Dunphy and Dick (1981), Dunphy and 
Stace (1993), Kotter (1995) and Lewin (1951). These theorists all argue that specific changes 
should be embedded into the organisation's culture. Introducing a new security protocol 
would be an apt example of a change requiring this treatment. Embedding change into culture 
is typically the last and most difficult part of a planned change process, though often the most 
important if the change is to remain. A major computer security breach or the threat of one 
may be sufficient to establish a sense of critical urgency needed to convince organisational 
members ofthe need to do things differently. This is the first step in most theorists' 
recommendations for successful planned change. 
Embedding WNV As into organisational culture could be helped by incorporating them, and 
an appropriate framework for carrying them out, into standard operating procedures. To apply 
Schein's ideas about the importance of organisational stories and rituals in transmitting and 
embedding aspects of culture, organisational stories about security breaches detected and 
harm avoided, preferably without damage to other employees' privacy and with appropriate 
rewards allocated, could over the long term change users' perceptions about the risks and 
rewards of WNV As. 
Such cultural change is unlikely to happen without problems. The necessary cultural shifts 
may well threaten aspects of ICT professionals' work identity, for example, since subcultures 
including those of IT professionals have been shown to depend in part on their special 
expertise which contributes to the power they can exercise in organisations (Jermier et al. 
1991; Sackman 1992). This and other implications of the results of the present study, for 
example in the areas of IT professional ethics, computer security awareness education, and so 
on, requires further research. 
6 References 
Anonymous (2003) 'Wireless networks grow dramatically, but security remains a 
problem, report says', Electronic Commerce News, 8 (31 March). 
Argyris, C. (1990) Overcoming Organizational Defenses. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
Berghel, H. and Uecker J. (2004) 'Wireless Infidelity I: War Driving', Communications of 
the ACM, 47 (9), pp. 21-26. 
9 
Dunphy, D. and Dick, R (1981) Organizational Change by Choice. Sydney, New York: 
McGraw-Hill. 
Dunphy, D. and Stace, D. (1993) 'The Strategic Management of Corporate Change', 
Human Relations, 46 (8), pp. 905-20. 
Dyce, K. (2005) A Wireless Vulnerability Assessment Framework: A developed prototype 
wireless vulnerability assessment framework and a study into their use in the real world. 
Unpublished Honours thesis, University ofWollongong. 
Henning, R R (2003) Vulnerability Assessment in Wireless Networks, Harris Corporation, 
[Available Online: http://www.cs.nmt.edu/-cs553/paped5.pdf), Accessed 5 January 2006. 
Hofstede, G. (1980) Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work Related 
Values, Beverly Hills: Sage. 
Hofstede, G. (1991) Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind, London: McGraw-
Hill. 
Hofstede, G. (1993) 'Cultural Constraints in Management Theories', Academy of 
Management Executive, (February), pp. 81-94. 
Housley, R and Arbaugh, W. (2003) 'Security Problems in 802.11-based Networks', 
Communications of the ACM, 46 (5) (May), pp. 31-34. 
Jermier, J. M., Slocum, J. W., Fry, L. W. and Gaines, J. (1991) 'Organizational Subcultures in 
a Soft Bureaucracy: Resistance Behind the Myth and Fac;ade of an Official Culture', 
Organizational Science, (May), pp. 170-94. 
Kotter, J. P. (1995) 'Leading Change: Why Transformational Efforts Fail', Harvard Business 
Review, 73 (March-April), pp. 59-67. 
Lewin, K. (1951) Field Theory in Social Science. New York: Harper and Row. 
O'Reilly III, C. A., Chatman, J. and Caldwell, D. F. (1991) 'People and Organizational 
Culture: A Profile Comparison Approach to Assessment of Person-Organization Fit' , 
Academy of Management Journal, (September), pp. 487-516. 
Nichols, R K. and Lekkas, P. C. (2002) Wireless Security: Models, Threats and Solutions, 
New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Peltier, T. R, Peltier, J. and Blackley, J. A. (2003) Managing a Network Vulnerability 
Assessment, Auerbach Publications, USA. 
Sackmann, S. A. (1992) 'Culture and Subcultures: an Analysis of Organizational knowledge' , 
Administrative Science Quarterly, (March), pp. 140-61. 
Schein, E. H. (1985) Organizational Culture and Leadership. San Francisco, CA: Jossey 
Bass. 
Schein, E. H. (1993) 'On Dialogue, Culture, and Organizational Learning', Organizational 
Dynamics, (Winter), pp. 40-51. 
10 
Simon, Herbert A .. (1979) 'Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations', 
American Economic Review, 69 (4), pp. 493-513. 
Spurling, P. (1995) 'Promoting security awareness and commitment', Information 
Management & Computer Security, 3 (2), pp. 20-26. 
Takanen, A., Vuorijarvi, P., Laakso, M. and Roning, J. (2004) 'Agents of responsibility in 
software vulnerability processes', in Ethics and Information Technology, 6, pp. 93-110. 
Tiller, J. S. (2005) The Ethical Hack: A Frameworkfor Business Value Penetration 
Testing, Auerbach Publications, USA. 
11 
